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Off the Beaten Path: An Analysis of the Supreme Court's
Surprising Decision in Mickens v. Taylor
The Supreme Court stood poised to dispose of Mickens v.
Taylor.1 Through a flurry of decisions spanning a mere six-year
period,2 the Court had already established a rational framework for
evaluating claims of Sixth Amendment 3 violations based on the
ineffective assistance of counsel,4 particularly those arising out of an
alleged conflict of interest.' Surprisingly, however, the majority
opinion in Mickens v. Taylor6 not only departed from this framework,
1. 240 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding that the trial court's failure to
inquire into an apparent conflict of interest before trial does not relieve a defendant of the
burden to show that the conflict adversely affected his attorney's performance), affd, 122
S. Ct. 1237 (2002).
2. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261
(1981); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
3. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. For an overview of these procedural guarantees, as well as their
historical origins, see FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

3-35 (1953). An accused's right to counsel was first recognized in the seminal case of
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). The Powell Court, moreover, interpreted the
Sixth Amendment to require not only assistance, but effective assistance of counsel to an
accused.

Id. at 71; see ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN

AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 30 (1992). This same notion
was reiterated years later in Strickland, where the Court commented, "[the fact that] a
person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused ... is not
enough to satisfy the constitutional command." Strickland,466 U.S. at 685.
4. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (requiring a defendant to demonstrate both
deficient performance by the attorney and resulting prejudice to the defendant to establish
a violation of the Sixth Amendment).
5. See Wood, 450 U.S. at 273 (ordering remand where lower court failed to inquire
into a potential conflict of interest that was apparent at trial); Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 348, 350
(holding that a defendant who raised no objection at trial has the burden of showing an
actual conflict of interest existed that adversely affected his attorney's performance);
Holloway, 435 U.S. at 488 ("[W]henever a trial court improperly requires joint
representation over timely objection reversal is automatic.").
6. 122 S. Ct. 1237 (2002) (5-4 decision) (holding that the trial court's failure to
inquire into an apparent conflict of interest before trial does not relieve a defendant of the
burden to show that the conflict adversely affected his attorney's performance).
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but did so by positing a tenuous interpretation of a previously
unambiguous case.7
This Recent Development examines this
departure, as well as the dubious interpretation of Wood v. Georgia,8
and considers the ramifications for future Sixth Amendment claims.
The facts surrounding Walter Mickens's Sixth Amendment claim
are disturbing indeed. In 1993, Mickens was sentenced to death for
the murder of Timothy Hall, a juvenile who himself had been charged
with various crimes.9 Upon Mickens's petition for writ of habeas
corpus,"° a federal habeas attorney discovered that, almost
immediately after a juvenile court judge had dismissed the charges
against Hall (due to his death), she had appointed the very attorney
who had previously represented Hall to represent Mickens in his trial
for Hall's murder. 1 Though conceding that the trial judge had
neglected a duty to inquire into this potential conflict of interest,'12 the
Supreme Court nevertheless denied Mickens's petition, stating that
he had failed to show any adverse effect of the conflict on his
attorney's performance. 3
To comprehend the startling nature of this decision, it is critical
to understand the Court's earlier framework for Sixth Amendment
claims based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The general rule,
set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 4 enumerated two requirements
7. Id. at 1243-44 (interpreting Wood to require a showing of an actual conflict of
interest as well as the conflict's adverse effect on defense counsel's performance). In his
dissent, Justice Stevens rejected the majority's interpretation, declaring it to be in direct
conflict with Wood's unambiguous holding. See id. at 1251-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("As we unambiguously stated in Wood, Sullivan mandates a reversal when the trial court
has failed to make an inquiry even though it 'knows or reasonably should know that a
particular conflict exists.' " (quoting Wood, 450 U.S. at 272 n.18)).
8. 450 U.S. 261 (1981).
9. See Mickens, 122 S. Ct. at 1239-40; see also Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348, 35254 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (describing the nature of Hall's death and previous criminal
charges), affd, 122 S. Ct. 1237 (2002).
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994 ed. & Supp. V).
11. See Mickens, 122 S. Ct. at 1240; see also Mickens, 240 F.3d at 353-54 (relating the
circumstances surrounding the judicial appointment of Bryan Saunders as defense counsel
for Hall and, two weeks later, for Mickens in the murder of Hall).
12. See Mickens, 122 S. Ct. at 1245.
13. See id.; see also Charles Lane, Court Clears Way for Va. Execution: Lawyer
Conflict Allegation Rejected, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2002, at Al (reporting on the outcome
of Mickens at the U.S. Supreme Court). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had
made a similar ruling. See Mickens, 240 F.3d at 359. Mickens was subsequently put to
death by lethal injection on June 12, 2002. Maria Glod, Execution Culminates Va. Legal
Odyssey: Rights of Killer Split Supreme Court, WASH. POST, June 13, 2002, at B1.
14. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Prior to Strickland, the Court had not addressed the standard
for proving a general claim of ineffective assistance under the Sixth Amendment. See id.
at 683 ("The petition presents a type of Sixth Amendment claim that this Court has not
previously considered in any generality.").
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for reversal of a defendant's criminal conviction based on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. 5 First, the defendant must show
that counsel's assistance was objectively deficient, as measured by
prevailing professional norms. 6 Second, the defendant must establish

that such deficiencies resulted in prejudice."
The prejudice requirement is very difficult to satisfy, as the
defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for her
counsel's deficiencies, the outcome of her trial would have been
different. 8 A reasonable probability, the Strickland Court noted, "is
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."' 9
The mere possibility, then, that the outcome would have been
different, absent counsel's errors, is insufficient to meet the prejudice

requirement.20
The Supreme Court has, however, carved out two notable

instances where prejudice may be presumed without an actual
showing by the defendant. First, a presumption of prejudice is
appropriate where the defendant has been denied counsel outright or
during a critical stage of the proceedings.21 For instance, following a
denial of counsel at trial, the Court in Gideon v. Wainwright22
commented that "lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not
luxuries,"23 and accordingly reversed Gideon's conviction without
requiring him to show prejudice. 4 The Court instead simply
presumed that denial of counsel resulted in prejudice. 5
15. Id. at 687. Strickland involved a defendant on trial for three stabbing murders,
torture, kidnapping, and other similarly heinous crimes. Id. at 671-72. Despite acting
against his counsel's advice on numerous occasions throughout discovery and trial, id. at
672, the defendant sought reversal of his conviction based in part on his attorney's alleged
ineffective assistance. Id. at 675. The Supreme Court, having set forth the appropriate
analysis for Sixth Amendment claims based on ineffective assistance of counsel, infra
notes 16-17 and accompanying text, affirmed the defendant's conviction. See Strickland,
466 U.S. at 700-01.
16. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. While such norms, the Court noted, may be
reflected in the American Bar Association standards, these standards are merely
guidelines and do not serve as an exhaustive set of rules. Id. at 688. Moreover, "[a]ny
such set of rules," the Court rationalized, "would interfere with the constitutionally
protected independence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in
making tactical decisions." Id. at 689.
17. Id. at 687.
18. Id. at 694.
19. Id.
20. See id. at 693-94.
21. Id. at 692 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984)).
22. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
23. Id. at 344.
24. See id. at 344-45. Gideon had been charged with breaking and entering a pool
hall with the intent to commit a misdemeanor. Id. at 336. After appearing in Florida state
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A presumption of prejudice may also be appropriate where
defense counsel has labored under a conflict of interest.26 The extent

of such a presumption, however, is dependent on whether the trial
court knew or should have known of the potential conflict. If the
court does not know and has no reason to know of the potential
conflict, then under Cuyler v. Sullivan27 the trial court does not have
an affirmative duty to inquire into said conflict. 28 Under such
circumstances the defendant must show, first, that an actual conflict
existed, and second, that the conflict adversely affected counsel's

performance.29 Upon such a showing actual prejudice may then be
presumed.3 0

court without an attorney, Gideon requested the judge to appoint one for him. Id. at 337.
The judge denied Gideon's request, stating that judicially appointed counsel was only
guaranteed in cases involving capital offenses. Id. In justifying a reversal, the Supreme
Court noted that "[t]he right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed
fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours." Id. at 344.
25. See id. at 344-45; see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-59 (1984)
(holding that the denial of counsel is so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of
litigating the denial's actual prejudice is unnecessary).
26. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345-50 (1980)).
Professor Brent Coverdale has aptly noted that this lesser standard entices defendants to
couch ordinary ineffective assistance claims, subject to the higher standard of Strickland,
in terms of conflict of interest claims, thereby eliminating the burden of showing actual
prejudice. Brent Coverdale, Cuyler versus Strickland: The Proper Standard for SelfInterested Conflicts of Interest, 47 U. KAN. L. REv. 209, 210 (1998).
27. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
28. Id. at 347. In Sullivan, three defendants were represented by the same pair of
attorneys for the murder of two labor officials. Id. at 337. At no time did any of the
defendants, or their counsel, object to the multiple representation. Id. at 337-38. Sullivan
was tried first and convicted; the remaining defendants were later acquitted. Id. at 338.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether a possible
conflict of interest actually existed and whether it adversely affected counsels'
performance. See id. at 348, 350.
29. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692; Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 348, 350. Sullivan's two-pronged
test has been implemented in a host of circuits. See, e.g., Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663,
689 (4th Cir. 2002) ("On a conflict of interest claim, petitioner must show (1) that his
attorney had 'an actual conflict of interest' and (2) that the conflict of interest 'adversely
affected his lawyer's performance.' " (quoting Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 348)), cert. denied, 123
S. Ct. 890 (2003); United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 1011 (11th Cir. 2001) ("If a
defendant carries his burden of showing an actual conflict of interest, a court must then
consider whether the conflict adversely affected his representation."), cert. denied, 122 S.
Ct. 2345 (2002); Pegg v. United States, 253 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001) ("To obtain
relief on a [claim of ineffective assistance arising from a conflict of interest], a defendant
must show first, that his attorney had an actual conflict of interest, and second, that the
conflict adversely affected counsel's performance."), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1435 (2002);
Strouse v. Leonardo, 928 F.2d 548, 555 (2d Cir. 1991) ("If the court finds that [defendant's]
representation was infected by an actual conflict of interest, it should then determine
whether this conflict 'adversely affected' his performance." (quoting Sullivan, 446 U.S. at
350)).
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The distinction between a showing of prejudice and a showing of
adverse effect is significant, as the latter is less burdensome on the
defendant.3 1
A showing of prejudice requires a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's deficiencies, the outcome of the
trial would have been different.3 2 A showing of adverse effect
requires only that there existed a plausible alternative defense
strategy that defense counsel might have pursued were it not for the
actual conflict.3 A showing of adverse effect, then, need not show
that the outcome at trial would have been different. 4
If the trial court knows or reasonably should know of the
potential conflict of interest 35 then the requirements for reversal
become further relaxed. In such a situation, Sullivan held that the
trial court has an affirmative duty to inquire into the potential
conflict.36 Where the trial court neglects this duty despite defense
counsel's efforts to notify the court of the conflict, Holloway v.

An actual conflict of interest exists when defense counsel places himself in a
position conducive to divided loyalties. United States v. Carpenter, 769 F.2d 258, 263 (5th
Cir. 1985) (citing Mitchell v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 77, 79 (5th Cir. 1982)); see United States v.
Christikas, 238 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2001). To show that the actual conflict adversely
affected defense counsel's performance, the defendant must show that there existed a
plausible and reasonable alternative defense strategy that might have been pursued, but
for the conflict of interest. E.g., Pegg, 253 F.3d at 1277-79 ("To prove adverse effect...
petitioner must show: 1) the existence of a plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic
that might have been pursued; 2) that the alternative strategy or tactic was reasonable
under the facts; and 3) a link between the actual conflict and the decision to forgo the
alternative strategy."); Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348, 360-61 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc)
(illustrating that defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was based on his
lawyer's failure to pursue various defense strategies due to an actual conflict of interest),
affd, 122 S. Ct. 1237 (2002). Failure to establish both elements of the Sullivan test renders
a defendant's claim unsuccessful. See Pegg, 253 F.3d at 1275 (finding no causal link, and
therefore no adverse effect, between the conflict of interest and several alternative
defense strategies that were not pursued).
30. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 349-50.
31. E.g., Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 787 n.6 (1987) (noting that a showing of
adverse effect is not equivalent to the more difficult showing of prejudice).
32. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
33. See supra note 29.
34. See Kemp, 483 U.S. at 799 n.6; Mickens 240 F.3d at 360.
35. In cases involving multiple representation of defendants, for instance, the trial
judge should reasonably know of potential conflicts. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S.
153, 159-61 (1988) (discussing the inherent problems confronting joint representation); see
also FED. R. CRIM. P. 44C (requiring the court to inquire into cases of joint representation
to determine that no conflict of interest exists).
36. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980). The basis for such a duty originates in
the trial court's independent interest in ensuring that the defendant receives a fair trial.
See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160. Note, however, that where a trial court has no reason to know
of a potential conflict, no affirmative duty to inquire exists. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 347.
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Arkansas37 succinctly held that "reversal is automatic" 3 and the
defendant is entitled to a new trial. 39 A showing of neither prejudice
nor adverse effect is therefore required.4"
Even absent such notification from defense counsel, a trial
court's affirmative duty to inquire into an apparent conflict still
remains.41 According to Wood v. Georgia,4 2 where the trial court fails
to make an inquiry under such circumstances, the defendant need
only show that an actual conflict existed in order to receive a new
trial; again, neither a showing of prejudice nor adverse effect is
required. 43 Because the Court in Mickens relied heavily on its
interpretation of Wood,' it is perhaps appropriate to examine briefly
Wood's factual context.
Wood involved three individuals who were arrested for the sale
and distribution of pornographic materials in connection with their
employment. 45 The defendants' employer provided for their legal
defense with his own attorney.46 In addition, the employer had
previously paid all fines levied on defendants for similar citations in
the past. 47 On this particular occasion, however, the employer failed
to pay the fines, and the defendants were accordingly penalized.48
37. 435 U.S. 475 (1978). In Holloway three defendants were on trial for one count of
robbery and two counts of rape. Id. at 477. The trial court appointed a single attorney to
represent all three defendants. Id. Following a discussion with his clients, the attorney
determined that there was a possible conflict of interest and moved the court to appoint
separate counsel. Id. His request was denied after a hearing on the issue. Id. Counsel
renewed his request several times during trial, but each of these requests was denied as
well. Id. at 478-80. The jury thereafter found all three defendants guilty on all counts. Id.
at 481. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the convictions and remanded the case to
the trial court. Id. at 491.
38. Id. at 488. Whether or not reversal is automatic upon the prosecution's objection
is somewhat unclear. The Court's justification for a presumption of prejudice makes sense
only with respect to objections made by defense counsel; the Court noted that defense
counsel is in the best position to determine whether a conflict exists, and that his
declarations to the court are in essence made under oath. Id. at 485-86. In any event,
objections made by prosecuting attorneys alleging defense counsel's conflict of interest
rarely succeed. See Jeff Brown, Disqualificationof the Public Defender: Toward a New
Protocolfor Resolving Conflicts of Interest, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 7 n.38 (1996).
39. See Holloway, 435 U.S. at 491.
40. See id. at 487-88.
41. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 270, 272 (1981); Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 347.
42. 450 U.S. 261 (1981).
43. See id. at 273-74 (remanding to determine only whether an actual conflict of
interest existed at the time of trial).
44. See Mickens v. Taylor, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 1242-45 (2002).
45. Wood, 450 U.S. at 263.
46. Id. at 266.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 267.
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The Court surmised that the employer had intentionally failed to
make the payments in order to obtain a ruling on an Equal Protection
Clause issue presented by the case.49 In light of this suspicion, the
Court remanded the case to determine whether the lawyer, acting as
an agent of the employer, had labored under a conflict of interest in
his representation of the defendants."0 In justifying the remand order
without first requiring an affirmative showing of adverse effect, the
Court emphatically declared that "Sullivan mandates a reversal when
the trial court has failed to make an inquiry even though it 'knows or
reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists.' "51
It is crucial to note that even in instances where the trial court
should have known of the potential conflict of interest, but either
rejected counsel's objections 2 or failed to independently inquire, 3 the
Court does not deviate from the general requirements set forth in
Strickland.4 Provided that the defendant demonstrates that an actual
conflict existed, the reviewing court may simply presume that the
conflict resulted in prejudice. 5 Upon such a showing, therefore, both
of Strickland's requirements for a Sixth Amendment violation are
satisfied. 6 In this sense, then, neither Holloway nor Wood provides
exceptions to the general rule in Strickland; rather, both cases merely
indicate when a defendant's burden may be lessened to satisfy the
Strickland requirements.
Recognizing this framework, it would appear that Mickens falls
neatly into the Wood-type scenario. 7 Both the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court conceded that the trial
judge in Mickens should have been aware of the potential conflict
arising from appointing Hall's former trial attorney to represent

49. Id.
50. Id. at 272-74.
51. Id. at 272 n.18 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980)).
52. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 477-80 (1978).
53. See Wood, 450 U.S. at 266-70.
54. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (requiring a showing of
both objective deficiencies in counsel's performance and prejudice resulting therefrom).
55. For justification of such a presumption where the trial judge has ignored defense
counsel's objection, see supra note 38. Even where no such objection is given, however, a
presumption of prejudice is still appropriate if the defendant can prove that an actual
conflict existed. Holloway, 435 U.S. at 489 ("[I]t is clear that the prejudice is presumed
regardless of whether it was independently shown.").
56. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.
57. The scenario referred to is one where the trial court neglected to inquire into a
potential conflict of interest of which it should have been aware, despite defense counsel's
failure to make it known to the court. See supranotes 41-51 and accompanying text.
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Hall's alleged murderer." As such, even though Hall's counsel raised
no objection, the judge had an affirmative duty to inquire into the
potential conflict. 9 Having failed to make such an inquiry, Wood
mandates reversal upon a showing only that an actual conflict existed,
without an additional showing of adverse effect.60
The majority in Mickens, however, held otherwise. The Court
held that the trial court's failure to inquire into the potential conflict,
despite its duty to do so, did not relieve Mickens of his burden to
show that the conflict adversely affected his counsel's performance.6
Moreover, the Court stated that such a holding was consistent with a
proper reading of Wood, noting that Wood in fact required a showing
62
of adverse effect as well.
In support of this rationale, the majority reasoned that Wood's
requirement of "an actual conflict of interest"63 impliedly
incorporated a requirement to show an adverse effect as well, thereby
requiring both elements to warrant reversal despite mentioning only
one.64 Specifically, the Court attempted to explain the absence of any
"adverse effect" language in Wood by its desire to use "shorthand." 65
On its face, the phrase "actual conflict of interest" could arguably
convey both the notion that a conflict existed and the notion that the
conflict had an adverse effect on counsel's assistance. That is, the use
of "actual" coupled with the phrase "conflict of interest" could
conceivably signify a conflict that adversely affected counsel's
representation, as opposed to "a mere theoretical division of
loyalties."66

58. See Mickens v. Taylor, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 1245 (2002); Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d
348, 357 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
59. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980).
60. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 273-74 (1981). Justices Stevens and Souter
endorsed such an analysis in their separately filed dissents. See Mickens, 122 S.Ct. at 1248
(Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1253-54 (Souter, J., dissenting). In his dissent, which was
joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer went further, arguing that "in a case such as this
one, a categorical approach is warranted and automatic reversal is required." Id. at 1264
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
61. Mickens, 122 S.Ct. at 1245.
62. Id. at 1243-44.
63. Wood, 450 U.S. at 273.
64. Mickens, 122 S.Ct. at 1243-44.
65. Id. at 1243. Justice Scalia maintained that the phrase "an actual conflict of
interest" in Wood, 450 U.S. at 273, was "shorthand for the statement in Sullivan that 'a
defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his
representationneed not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief.' " Mickens, 122 S.
Ct. at 1243 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1980)).
66. Mickens, 122 S.Ct. at 1243.

1276

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

This rationale becomes less plausible, however, upon a thorough
understanding of Wood's phrasing.67 In Wood, the Court employed
the phrase "actual conflict of interest '68 not to signify a conflict that
adversely affected counsel's representation, but rather to signify a
confirmation of the Court's firm suspicion that a conflict may have
existed. 69 Examination of the phrase in its full context clarifies this
usage:
[The trial court] should hold a hearing to determine whether
the conflict of interest that this record strongly suggests
actually existed at the time of the probation revocation or
earlier. If the court finds that an actual conflict of interest
existed at that time, and that there was no valid waiver of
the right to independent counsel, it must hold a new
revocation hearing that is untainted by a legal representative
serving conflicting interests.70
It is far-fetched to suppose that the Wood Court would first use the
word "actually" in its ordinary meaning, only to use the word "actual"
in the very next sentence as a term of art to signify a conflict that had
an adverse affect on defense counsel's performance.7 1 It is more
logical to conclude that both "actually" and "actual" are used in their
ordinary meanings and that a showing of adverse effect is simply not
required.7 2 Surely, if the Wood Court had intended to require such a
showing, it would have explicitly said so, as it did in Sullivan.73
67. See Wood, 450 U.S. at 273-74.
68. Id. at 273.
69. See id. at 272-73.
70. Id. at 273-74 (emphasis added).
71. Justice Stevens succinctly stated in his dissent, "Wood nowhere hints of this
meaning of 'actual conflict of interest' . .. nor does it reference Sullivan in 'shorthand.' "
Mickens, 122 S. Ct. at 1252 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Wood, 450 U.S. at 273, and
Mickens, 122 S.Ct. at 1243).
72. See supra note 71.
73. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980). Interestingly, the Court in
Mickens even attempted to dispel its earlier reading of Sullivan as espousing a two-prong
test. Compare Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (interpreting Sullivan as
requiring a defendant to show "that counsel 'actively represented conflicting interests' and
that 'an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance' " (quoting
Sullivan, 466 U.S. at 348, 350)), with Mickens, 122 S. Ct. at 1244 n.5 ("[T]he Sullivan
standard is not properly read as requiring inquiry into actual conflict as something
separate and apart from adverse effect."). Despite this contention, prior to Mickens,
appellate courts employed the interpretation reflected in Strickland. See, e.g., United
States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 1011 (11th Cir. 2001) ("If a defendant carries his burden
of showing an actual conflict of interest, a court must then consider whether the conflict
adversely affected his representation."), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2345 (2002); Pegg v. United
States, 253 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001) ("To obtain relief on a [claim of ineffective
assistance arising from a conflict of interest], a defendant must show first, that his attorney
had an actual conflict of interest, and second, that the conflict adversely affected counsel's
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The majority's second argument in support of its reinterpretation
of Wood is equally unsatisfying. The Court attempted to show how
Wood's seemingly plain language, which mandates reversal whenever
a trial court has neglected its duty to inquire,74 was not, after all, quite
so plain. 75 The majority suggested-that the statement mandating
reversal could not mean, in effect, what it sounds like it means, for
otherwise the statement and the disposition of Wood would be
inconsistent with each other.76 In other words, the fact that Wood was
remanded, instead of reversed outright, renders impossible the plain
language interpretation of the statement mandating reversal.77
Such a suggestion, however, overlooks the true reason for
Wood's remand. The case was not remanded, as the Mickens Court
stated, 78 so that the defendant might show an adverse effect of his
counsel's conflict of interest. Instead, it was remanded due to the
Wood Court's firm suspicion that there existed an actual conflict of
interest that the trial judge should have recognized.79 Mindful of the
fact that suspicion alone is insufficient to demonstrate the existence of
a conflict, ° the Wood Court therefore remanded to confirm whether
a conflict actually existed. Wood's instruction, set forth above, clearly
reflected this sentiment.8 1 Moreover, such an instruction is perfectly
consistent with the earlier statement mandating reversal where the
trial court failed to inquire into an apparent conflict. In the case of
Wood, if upon remand the court determined that the conflict actually

performance."), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1435 (2002); Strouse v. Leonardo, 928 F.2d 548, 555
(2d Cir. 1991) ("If the court finds that [defendant's] representation was infected by an
actual conflict of interest, it should then determine whether this conflict 'adversely
affected' his performance." (quoting Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 350)). After Mickens, at least
one court has decided to continue to follow the Strickland interpretation. See Fullwood v.
Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 689 (4th Cir. 2002) ("On a conflict-of-interest claim, petitioner must
show (1) that his attorney had 'an actual conflict of interest' and (2) that the conflict of
interest 'adversely affected his lawyer's performance.' " (quoting Sullivan, 446 U.S. at
348)), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 890 (2003).

74. See Wood, 450 U.S. at 272 n.18 ("Sullivan mandates a reversal when the trial court
has failed to make an inquiry even though it 'knows or reasonably should know that a
particular conflict exists.' " (quoting Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 347)).
75. In his dissent, Justice Souter regarded the Court's words here as "a polite way of
saying that the Wood Court did not know what it was doing." Mickens, 122 S.Ct. at 1257
(Souter, J.,
dissenting).
76. See id. at 1243 n.3.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 1243-44.
79. See Wood, 450 U.S. at 267,272.
80. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980) ("[T]he possibility of conflict is
insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction." (emphasis added)).
81. Supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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existed, reversal would be mandatory.82 Otherwise, the conviction
would stand.83
Recognizing the Mickens Court's curious interpretation of Wood,
one notes that the additional justification given for the Mickens
Justice Scalia's majority opinion
holding is equally puzzling.
propounded two reasons to validate Mickens's requirement that
adverse effect be shown even where the trial court failed to inquire
into an apparent conflict. First, he wrote that to relieve Mickens of
the burden of such a showing would result in poor public policy.84
Second, Justice Scalia claimed that where a trial court fails to inquire
into an apparent conflict, requiring a defendant to show both an
actual conflict and adverse effect does not result in a more difficult
task for the reviewing court."
Regarding the public policy rationale, the Court characterized
Mickens's interpretation of Wood as proposing a rule of "automatic
reversal when there existed a conflict that did not affect counsel's
performance, but the trial judge failed to make the Sullivan-mandated
inquiry." 86 The Court responded that such an interpretation would
result in poor public policy.87 Although left unstated, the Court's
reasoning appears to be that to allow reversal on account of a conflict
that did not adversely affect defendant's representation would be to
cast aside a perfectly sound verdict; that is, a verdict untainted by the
conflict of interest.8 8 To do so would provide the defendant with a
new trial despite the legitimacy of his first trial and conviction.89 Such
an allowance therefore would oppose public policy.
Although this rationale appears reasonable, Wood in no way
proposed a rule mandating reversal where a trial judge failed to
inquire into an apparent conflict but the conflict did not adversely
affect counsel's representation. 90 Rather, Wood instead held that
where the trial judge failed to inquire into an apparent conflict, the

82. See Wood, 450 U.S. at 273-74.
83. See id.
84. Mickens v. Taylor, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 1244 (2002).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272-74 (1981). Nor does it appear that
Mickens himself made such a proposition. See Mickens, 122 S. Ct. at 1243 (construing
Brief for Petitioner at 21).
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defendant need not show that the conflict adversely affected counsel's
performance.91
The distinction between these two formulations, although subtle,
is significant and requires a review of the notions of prejudice and
adverse effect.92
Where counsel's conflict has prejudiced the
defendant, there is a reasonable probability that, absent the conflict,
the outcome would have been different. 93 That the outcome would
have been different absent the conflict suggests that there was a
plausible alternative defense strategy that counsel might have
pursued, namely, a strategy that would have led to an acquittal. It is
well established that where such an alternative defense strategy
existed but was not pursued due to counsel's conflict, the conflict had
an adverse effect on the defendant's representation.94 The notion of
prejudice therefore encompasses that of adverse effect; where
prejudice has occurred due to counsel's conflict of interest, the
conflict must necessarily have had an adverse effect on counsel's
performance.95
An understanding of the relationship between prejudice and
adverse effect renders the Court's public policy reasoning
unpersuasive. Recall that the foundational premise for the Court's
rationale is that Mickens, relying on Wood, proposed a rule requiring
reversal where there existed an apparent conflict, neglected by the
trial court, that did not affect counsel's performance. 96 Under Wood,
however, any apparent conflict neglected by the trial court is
presumed to have prejudiced the defendant. Because prejudice
entails adverse effect, 97 any apparent conflict which the trial court
neglected to investigate must necessarily have had an adverse effect
on counsel's performance. The Court's fundamental premise is
therefore invalid.
This invalidity undermines the remainder of the Court's
reasoning as well, as it eliminates any chance that a defendant would
receive a new trial despite the conflict having not adversely affected
counsel's performance. Such a possibility was the policy concern
expressed in Mickens.98

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See Wood, 450 U.S. at 272-74.
See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 29, 32-33 and accompanying text.
See Mickens v. Taylor, 122 S. Ct. 1237, 1244 (2002).
See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
Mickens, 122 S. Ct. at 1244.
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The majority's remaining justification for its holding in Mickens
is concerned not with defendants asserting Sixth Amendment
violations based on conflicts of interest, but rather with the courts
who must hear these claims. Mickens states that a trial court's failure
to inquire into a known conflict, despite its duty to do so, does not
"make it harder for reviewing courts to determine conflict and
effect."99 The unstated conclusion seems to be that because the
reviewing court does not shoulder an additional burden as a result of
the trial court's negligence, there is little reason to sanction the lower
court by allowing reversal upon a mere showing of actual conflict. 100
In essence, this argument asserts that Mickens is justified because
the trial court's failure to inquire into an apparent conflict of interest
does not make it harder for the reviewing court to evaluate a
defendant's showing of actual conflict and adverse effect. Such
reasoning conspicuously ignores the fact that, absent the Mickens
holding, the reviewing court need not evaluate a defendant's showing
of adverse effect at all; the reviewing court is relieved from such an
evaluation because the defendant himself is not required to make
such a showing. The reviewing court, under Wood, actually enjoys a
lesser burden upon review than it would if Mickens were applied.
Therefore, despite its reasoning to the contrary, Mickens actually
resulted in the reviewing court shouldering a heavier burden than it
10 1
would have under Wood.
Perhaps the court viewed Mickens's situation as a case of
harmless error and was therefore reluctant to permit reversal given
his apparent guilt. 2 After all, if in fact Mickens murdered Hall, even
the most perfect representation could never erase Mickens's guilt.
Yet a review of the Court's general framework for Sixth
Amendment violations reveals why an appeal to harmless error to
account for the Court's holding fails. While Strickland required that
the defendant demonstrate both objective deficiencies in his
representation and prejudice resulting therefrom,103 Wood, Sullivan,
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. It could be argued that the Court's reasoning here is premised on its earlier
contention that there is no distinction to be drawn between a showing of actual conflict
and a showing of adverse effect. See id. at 1244 n.5. Accepting such a premise would in
fact result in the reviewing court not enduring a greater burden upon review. However, as
shown above, such a premise is itself suspect and therefore renders the Court's overall
argument tenuous at best. See supra notes 29-30, 63-73 and accompanying text.
102. See Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348, 352-53 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc), af-'d, 122 S.
Ct. 1237 (2002).
103. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
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and Holloway all illustrate situations where prejudice need not be
shown, as it is instead presumed to have occurred. 104 As discussed
above," 5 both Wood and Mickens involved the failure of a trial judge
to investigate a conflict of interest of which the judge had actual or
constructive knowledge. This factual context justifies a presumption
of prejudice upon a showing that the conflict actually existed." 6 The
Court certainly suggested that Mickens made such a showing, 107 and,
as such, a presumption of prejudice was appropriate under Wood.108
Where prejudice has occurred on account of judicial error, such error,
by definition, cannot be harmless. Therefore, a denial of Mickens's
petition cannot be premised on the notion that the conflict of interest
constituted harmless error, even given Mickens's apparent guilt. As
noted in Chapman v. California,°9 where prejudicial error has
occurred, "[a] conviction must be reversed ...even if the defendant
was clearly guilty." '

The possibility remains that the Court simply perceived Mickens
as conceptually distinct from Sullivan, Holloway, and Wood and

therefore exempt from the framework governing these cases.
Mickens, of course, involved a conflict of interest arising from
successive representation, while its predecessor cases concerned

conflicts stemming from concurrent representation."'

It might well

be that such a conceptual distinction would render inapposite an
analysis of Mickens under the Sullivan-Holloway-Wood framework." 2

If such were the case, however, one would expect the Court to
recognize the distinction initially, explain the rationale for Sullivan's
104. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272-74 (2001); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S.
335, 349-50 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475,488-89 (1978).
105. See supranotes 45-60 and accompanying text.
106. See Wood, 450 U.S. at 272-74.
107. See Mickens v. Taylor, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 1245 (2002). The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit had conceded the same. See Mickens, 240 F.3d at 360.
108. See Wood, 450 U.S. at 272-74.
109. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
110. Id. at 43 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result); see also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510, 535 (1927) (noting that regardless of the evidence against him, a defendant is entitled
to a fair trial). It should be reiterated that reversal resulting from a successful ineffective
assistance claim results in a new trial, not an outright acquittal; if a defendant is as guilty as
he appears, he would presumably be convicted following the second trial as well.
111. For a general discussion of concurrent and successive conflicts of interest, see
STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 23133 (6th ed. 2002).
112. Lower courts, however, have had little difficulty in applying the traditional
analysis to such cases. For an application of the Sullivan-Holloway-Wood framework, see
Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 775, 797-99 (5th Cir. 2000), and Freund v. Butterworth, 165
F.3d 839, 858-60 (11th Cir. 1999).
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inapplicability, and then set forth an analysis specific to cases of
successive representation. Instead, the majority acknowledged the
family of prior cases involving concurrent interests" 3 and then
reached its conclusion based upon an application of the Sullivan
standard.114 Only later, after affirming the Fourth Circuit's ruling, did
the Court suggest in dicta that such a standard might be inappropriate
in successive representation cases."' The fact remains, however, that
the standard was used in Mickens, and, as such, justification for its
conclusion as based on a successive representation analysis is
unsubstantiated.
Despite the Court's spurious justifications for its holding, the
likely effects of Mickens on similar Sixth Amendment claims in the
future must be considered. First, it appears that in Mickens the Court
has all but abolished a trial court's affirmative duty to inquire into an
apparent conflict, 16 a duty clearly pronounced in earlier decisions. 7
The majority stated that reversal is proper only upon a showing of
both an actual conflict and an adverse effect of that conflict, even
where the trial court had reason to know of the potential conflict yet
failed to inquire.1 8 A trial court's ruling, then, is no more susceptible
to reversal if the court neglects its duty to inquire. Inquiry or no
inquiry, the defendant must still demonstrate both actual conflict and
adverse effect. Therefore, little incentive remains for the trial court
to make the inquiry, and its affirmative duty to do so becomes "just a
matter of words, devoid of sanction; it ceases to be any duty at all. 119
With the trial judge stripped of all responsibility to flush out
potential conflicts of interest, such responsibility falls uneasily on
counsels' shoulders. Mickens attaches undue significance to whether
counsel makes a formal objection to a conflict of interest-only where
113. See Mickens v. Taylor, 122 S. Ct. 1237, 1240-41 (2002) ("The nub of the question
before us is whether the principle established by these [concurrent interest] cases provides
an exception to the general rule of Strickland under the circumstances of the present case.
To answer that question, we must examine those cases in some detail.").
114. Id. at 1244.
115. See id. at 1245.
116. See id. at 1262-63 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
117. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272-73 (1981) (observing that the
potential conflict of interest was apparent at trial and should have been investigated by the
judge); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346-47 (1980) (stating that where a court knows
or reasonably should know of a particular conflict, the court must inquire as to the nature
of the conflict); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1978) (holding that a trial
judge's failure to inquire into a potential conflict of interest made known to her deprived
the defendant of effective assistance of counsel).
118. See Mickens, 122 S.Ct. at 1245.
119. Id. at 1263 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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such an objection is made and ignored by the trial judge is reversal
automatic. 2 Absent such an objection, reversal is allowed only upon
the "characteristically difficult" 121 showing of both actual conflict and
adverse effect. 2 A defendant is therefore at the mercy of his defense
counsel to make the formal objection, and, as the facts of Mickens
123
illustrate, counsel may be disinclined to make such an objection.
Such disinclination comes at the defendant's peril.
From a public policy perspective, which the majority claims to
consider, 24 Mickens again misses the mark. Conflicts of interest that
should have been identified and eliminated by a trial judge at or
before trial will instead linger, likely contaminating the remainder of
the trial, all the while costing the court system a great deal of time,
the parties a great deal of emotional stress, and the public a great deal
of money. 125 The losing defendant will likely appeal, inciting yet
another round of time-consuming, stressful, and expensive litigation,
made even more so by the harsh requirements of the Mickens
holding.

126

The most unfortunate effect, however, concerns neither the
courts nor the public, but rather the defendants themselves. While
both fairness and reason compel courts to require a defendant to
120. See id. at 1241-42 (citing Holloway, 435 U.S. at 488).
121. Id. at 1260 (Souter, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 1240-41.
123. See id. at 1239-40. Counsel's failure to object is not always the result of honest
oversight. For instance, in Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981), defense counsel was
employed by the defendants' boss, whose interests were served throughout trial. Counsel,
in an effort to further his employer's interests, failed to notify the trial court of the conflict
of interest. See id. at 266-67, 273 n.20.
124. See Mickens, 122 S.Ct. at 1244; see also supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
125. See Mickens, 122 S. Ct. at 1263 (Souter, J., dissenting).
126. One could argue, of course, that the demanding standards of Mickens (i.e.,
requiring a showing of both actual conflict and adverse effect where a trial judge has failed
to inquire into an apparent conflict) will result in fewer remands and consequently fewer
retrials. Fewer retrials will, in turn, conserve judicial resources and minimize inefficiency.
In this sense, then, Mickens might actually promote judicial efficiency.
Yet while Mickens may result in fewer retrials for defendants whose appeals are
based on a trial judge's failure to inquire into an apparent conflict, the proposed
disposition of Mickens, see supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text, would result in
fewer appeals initially filed on these grounds. Under this proposed disposition, trial
judges would have an increased incentive to inquire into an apparent conflict. See supra
notes 116-19 and accompanying text. Assuming that such an incentive was effective, there
would be fewer overall instances of a trial judge's failure to inquire into an apparent
conflict. Accordingly, there would be fewer appeals founded on such a failure, thereby
minimizing the number of potential retrials resulting therefrom. Moreover, even if it were
the case that the same number of retrials would be granted under Mickens, as decided, as
under the proposed disposition of Mickens, the judicial inefficiency of the former would be
evidenced by its surplus of appeals initially filed.
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show both actual conflict and adverse effect when the trial court had
no reason to know of the alleged conflict, Justice Souter rightly
asserted that such a "burden is indefensible when a judge was on
notice of the risk [of conflict] but did nothing.' 27 Time and time
again the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the importance of a
defendant's right to a fair trial.

28

Not only does Mickens erode this

fundamental principle at the trial level by permitting a judge to sit
idle while an obvious conflict of interest goes unchecked, but it does

so at the appellate level as well, requiring a defendant to bear the cost
of a trial judge's prior negligence. 29
The result is an
uncharacteristically unfair proposition that does little to strengthen
our confidence in the judicial system.
The Mickens decision is thus perplexing. The reasons for the
Court's rejection of Wood's traditional interpretation as adopted by
numerous lower courts 3 ' remains unsettled, as its only justifications
for doing so rely on dubious renderings of otherwise plain language.'
Equally unclear is the Court's departure from its pre-Mickens
framework, itself a logical means of balancing judicial diligence
against defendant accountability. The Court's justifications here, too,
are unsatisfying, as they are grounded in an unsubstantiated fear of a
defendant's windfall and result in imposing a greater burden upon the
reviewing court.'3 2
Nonetheless, we are left to face the troubling ramifications of
Mickens. Trial judges will likely become less vigilant, assured that
their failure to inquire into potential conflicts of interest will bring
them no impunity. Judicial resources will in turn be squandered by
127. Mickens, 122 S. Ct. at 1261 (Souter, J., dissenting).
128. See, e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 158 (1988) (noting that the Sixth
Amendment "was designed to assure fairness in the adversary criminal process");
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) ("The purpose [of the effective
assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment] is simply to ensure that criminal defendants
receive a fair trial."); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984) (noting that the
Sixth Amendment exists for the sake of preserving an accused's right to a fair trial).
129. See Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348, 369 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Michael, J.,
dissenting), affd, 122 S.Ct. 1237 (2002).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 278 F.3d 486, 492 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that
when the trial judge should have known of the conflict absent defense counsel's objection,
defendant need only show actual conflict, but when no conflict was apparent to the judge,
defendant must demonstrate conflict and adverse affect (citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S.
261, 272-74 (1981))), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 2376 (2002); United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d
146, 153 (2d Cir. 1994) ("When a possible conflict has been entirely ignored, reversal is
automatic."); Strouse v. Leonardo, 928 F.2d 548, 555 (2d Cir. 1991) (construing Wood to
mandate reversal upon trial court's failure to inquire into a known conflict).
131. See supra notes 63-83 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 84-101 and accompanying text.
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Most
appellate review that might easily have been avoided.
tragically, however, defendants themselves will bear the burden of the
judiciary's negligence, further subordinating their constitutional right
to a fair trial.
WM. C. TURNER HERBERT

